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Abstract. A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) network is an infrastructure that
allows the realization of the key distribution cryptographic primitive over long distances
and at high rates with information-theoretic security. In this work, we consider QKD
networks based on trusted repeaters from a topology viewpoint, and present a set of
analytical models that can be used to optimize the spatial distribution of QKD devices
and nodes in specific network configurations in order to guarantee a certain level of
service to network users, at a minimum cost. We give details on new methods and
original results regarding such cost minimization arguments applied to QKD networks.
These results are likely to become of high importance when the deployment of QKD
networks will be addressed by future quantum telecommunication operators. They will
therefore have a strong impact on the design and requirements of the next generation
of QKD devices.
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1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technology that uses the properties of quantum
mechanics to realize an important cryptographic primitive: key distribution ‡. Unlike
the techniques used in traditional “classical” cryptography, for which the security relies
on the conjectured computational hardness of certain mathematical problems, QKD
security can be formally proven. Secret keys established via QKD are information-
theoretically secure, which implies that any adversary trying to eavesdrop cannot obtain
any information on the transmitted keys at any point in the future, even if she possesses
extremely large computational resources.
The communication channels needed to perform QKD consist in an optical channel,
on which well-controlled quantum states of light are exchanged, and a classical channel
that is used for signaling during the quantum exchanges and for the classical post-
processing phase, namely key reconciliation. Their combination forms a communication
link, over which quantum key distribution allows two distant users to exchange a
specific type of data, in particular secret keys. In this sense, QKD is by nature a
telecommunication technology, and so QKD links can be combined with appropriately
designed nodes to form QKD networks.
The performance of QKD links has rapidly improved in the last years. Starting
from pioneering experiments in the 90s [1], important steps have been taken to bring
QKD from the laboratory to the open field. Thanks to the continuous efforts invested
in developing better QKD protocols and hardware, in parallel to the advancement of
security proofs (see [2, 3, 4] for reviews), the performance that can now be achieved, in
terms of attainable communication distance, secret key generation rate and reliability,
positions QKD as the first quantum information processing technology reaching a level
of maturity sufficient to target deployment over real-world networks. Indeed, off-the-
shelf QKD systems are now commercially available [5], and the first QKD networks have
recently been implemented [6, 7, 8].
Up till now, research in QKD has focused on building and optimizing individual
systems to reach the longest possible distance and/or the highest possible secret bit rate,
without taking into account the cost of such systems. However, as the perspective of
deploying QKD networks becomes a reality, the question of optimal resource allocation,
intrinsically linked to cost considerations, becomes relevant and important, as is the
case for any telecommunication network infrastructure. It becomes therefore necessary
to consider QKD from a cost perspective, and in particular study the potential trade-offs
of cost and performance that can occur in this context.
Following the above arguments, we consider in this work the design of QKD
networks from a topology viewpoint, and present techniques and analytical models that
can be used to optimize the spatial distribution of QKD devices and QKD nodes within
specific network architectures in order to guarantee a given level of service to the network
‡ More accurately, the primitive is that of secret key agreement using a public quantum channel and
a public authenticated classical channel.
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users, at a minimum cost. We also study how cost minimization arguments influence the
optimal working points of QKD links. We show in particular that, in the perspective
of QKD networks, individual QKD links should be operated at an optimal working
distance that can be significantly shorter than their maximum attainable distance.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we define a QKD network and
discuss the topology and characteristics of the network architecture that we consider in
this work. We also introduce the concept of a backbone network structure. In section 3,
we present our calculations and results on network topological optimization based on
cost arguments. In particular, we provide a comprehensive set of modeling tools and
cost function calculations in specific network configurations, and discuss the effect of
our results on the design of practical QKD networks. Finally, in section 4, we discuss
open questions and future perspectives for QKD networks.
2. QKD networks
Definition and types of QKD networks
Extending the range of quantum key distribution systems to very long distances, and
allowing the exchange of secret keys between multiple users necessitates the development
of a network infrastructure connecting multiple individual QKD links. Indeed, QKD
links are inherently only adapted to point-to-point key exchange between the two
endpoints of a quantum channel, while the signal-to-noise ratio decrease occurring with
propagation loss ultimately limits their attainable range. It is then natural to consider
QKD networks as a means to overcome these limitations.
A QKD network is an infrastructure composed of QKD links, i.e. pairs of QKD
devices linked by a quantum and a classical communication channel connecting two
separate locations, or nodes. These links are then used to connect multiple distant
nodes. Based on these resources and using appropriate protocols, this infrastructure
can enable the unconditionally secure distribution of symmetric secret keys between
any pair of legitimate users accessing the network.
QKD networks can be categorized in two general groups [9]: networks that cre-
ate an end-to-end quantum channel between the two users, and networks that require
a transport of the key over many intermediate trusted nodes. In the first group, we
find networks in which a classical optical function such as switching or multiplexing is
applied at the node level on the quantum signals sent over the quantum channel. This
approach allows multi-user QKD but cannot be used to extend the key distribution
distance. Much more advanced members of this group are the quantum repeater based
QKD networks. Quantum repeaters [10] can create a perfect end-to-end quantum chan-
nel by distributing entanglement between any two network users. The implementation
of quantum repeaters, however, requires complex quantum operations and quantum
memories, whose realization remains an experimental challenge. The same is true for
the simpler version of quantum repeaters, namely quantum relays [11], which on the
one hand do not require a quantum memory but on the other cannot arbitrarily extend
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the QKD communication distance.
Trusted repeater QKD networks: characteristics and assumptions
In this work, we are interested in the second group of networks, which we call trusted
repeater QKD networks. In these networks, the nodes act as trusted relays that store
locally QKD-generated keys in classical memories, and then use these keys to perform
long-distance key distribution between any two nodes of the network. Therefore,
trusted repeater QKD networks do not require nodes equipped with quantum memories;
they only require QKD devices and classical memories as well as processing units
placed within secure locations, and can thus be deployed with currently available
technologies. Indeed, the implementation of such networks has been the subject of
several international projects [7, 8, 12, 13].
As we will see in detail in the following section, the analysis of trusted repeater
QKD networks from a topology viewpoint and with the goal of achieving optimization
based on cost considerations involves modeling several characteristics of such a network,
namely the user distribution, the node distribution, the call traffic, and the traffic
routing. The user and node distributions, denoted by Π and M respectively, will
be considered as Poisson stochastic point processes, and will be thus modeled using
convenient stochastic geometry tools. Modeling the traffic demand is particularly subtle
because of the variation with respect to time and distance that this traffic may feature
in a real network. Calculations here will neglect these variations and will be performed
under the assumption of a uniform call volume between any pair of users, denoted as
V .
Finally, routing in trusted repeater QKD networks is performed according to the
following general principle: First, local keys are generated over QKD links and are
stored in nodes that are placed on both ends of each link. Global key distribution is
then performed over a QKD path, i.e. a one-dimensional chain of trusted relays con-
nected by QKD links, establishing a connection between two end nodes. Secret keys are
forwarded, in a hop-by-hop fashion, along these QKD paths. To ensure their secrecy,
one-time pad encryption and information-theoretically secure authentication, both re-
alized with a local QKD key, are performed. End-to-end information-theoretic security
is thus obtained between the end nodes, provided that the intermediate nodes can be
trusted.
Quantum backbone network architecture
Introducing hierarchy into network design can be an extremely convenient architectural
tool because it allows to break complex structures into smaller and more flexible
ensembles. Indeed, such hierarchical levels offer an efficient way to help solve resource
allocation problems arising in networks, ranging from network routing to network
deployment planning. In this work, we will associate the notion of hierarchy in QKD
networks with the existence of what we will call a quantum backbone network.
In classical networks and especially the Internet, a backbone line is a larger
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transmission line that carries data gathered from smaller lines that interconnect with
it. By analogy with this definition, the backbone QKD network is an infrastructure for
key transport that gathers the traffic of secret key from many individual QKD links.
QKD backbone links and nodes clearly appear as mutualized resources shared to provide
service to many pairs of users. Keeping the fruitful analogy with classical networks, we
will call access QKD links the point-to-point links used to connect QKD end users to
their nearest QKD backbone node.
The principle of traffic routing that we described above can be conveniently trans-
posed in the context of backbone networks. In this case, traffic from individual users is
gathered locally to backbone QKD nodes. This mutualized traffic is then routed hop-
by-hop over the backbone structure. Furthermore, it is important to note that the node
and user point process distributions are distinct when a backbone network is considered,
which might not be the case in a network without backbone.
In the following, we will derive cost functions for different QKD network
configurations, under the above assumptions regarding the topology and the way traffic
is routed in these networks, and as a function of the characteristics of individual QKD
links. We will then use the results to discuss how QKD networks should be dimensioned,
the optimal working points of QKD links, as well as the interest of adopting a hierarchical
architecture, materialized by the existence of a backbone, in QKD networks.
3. Topological optimization based on cost arguments
3.1. QKD links: characterizing the rate versus distance
The main element underlying the cost optimization related to the deployment of
quantum networks is the intrinsic performance of QKD links. This performance can
essentially be summarized by the function R(ℓ), which gives the rate, in bit/s, of secret
key that can be established over a QKD link of length ℓ.
Clearly, this secret key bit rate varies from system to system and comparisons
between systems are thus difficult to establish. Moreover, comparisons have to be
related to the security proofs for which the secret key bit rates have been derived.
Security proofs are not yet fully categorized, although important steps in this direction
have been taken [4].
As shown on figure 1, the typical curve describing the variation with distance of the
logarithm of the mean rate of secret bit establishment R(ℓ) can be essentially separated
into two parts:
• A linear part that is the region where the rate of secret key establishment varies
as a given power of the propagation attenuation. Since the attenuation η(ℓ) is
exponentially increasing with distance, logR(ℓ) is linear in ℓ.
• An exponential drop-off at longer distances, where the error rate rapidly
increases due to the growing contribution of detection dark counts. In this region,
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Figure 1. Typical profile of the Rate versus Distance curve for a single QKD link.
the decrease of the secret key rate is multi-exponential with distance. The slope of
the curve representing logR(ℓ) is thus becoming increasingly steep until a maximum
distance is reached.
For completeness, it is also important to mention the possibility that, for short
distances, the secret bit rate could be limited by a saturation of the detection setup.
This will be the case if the repetition rate at which the quantum signals are sent in
the quantum channel exceeds the bandwidth of the detector. We will however not
investigate this possibility any further in the remaining of this work.
The behavior of the secret bit rate function R(ℓ) can be described using essentially
three parameters, schematically shown on figure 1:
(i) The secret bit rate at zero distance, R0;
(ii) The scaling parameter λQKD in the linear region such that R(ℓ) = R0 e
−ℓ/λQKD ;
(iii) The distance at which the scaling of the rate becomes exponential, which is
comparable to the maximum attainable distance, Ddrop ∼ Dmax.
R0 is determined by the maximum clock rate of the QKD system. In QKD relying
on photon-counting detection setups, R0 is limited by the performance of the detectors,
and is usually in the Mbit/s range. Clearly, the solutions allowing to improve the
performance of the detectors have a direct impact on R0 [15, 14, 16, 17]. For QKD
systems relying on continuous variables [18], based on homodyne detection performed
with fast photodiodes, the experimental bound on R0 can be significantly higher,
potentially in the Gbit/s range. The computational complexity of the reconciliation
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however currently limits R0 in the Mbit/s range in the practical demonstrations
performed so far [19].
The scaling parameter λQKD is essentially determined by the attenuation η(ℓ) over a
quantum channel of length ℓ, and by a coefficient r that is mainly related to the security
proof that can be applied to the experimental system. In the case of a typical network
based on optical fibers, the attenuation η(ℓ) can be parametrized by an attenuation
coefficient α (in dB/km) as η(ℓ) = 10−αℓ/10 (for scaling of the attenuation in free space,
see [4]). In the linear part of the curve shown on figure 1, the rate R(ℓ) varies as a given
power r of the attenuation, R(ℓ) = R0 η(ℓ)
r. We can thus define the scaling parameter
as λQKD = 10/(α r log(10)). For QKD performed at telecom wavelengths, with protocols
optimized for long distance operation, we can take α = 0.22 dB/km and r = 1, which
leads us to λQKD = 19.7 km, as the typical scaling distance for such QKD systems.
This parameter is important since, as we shall see in the following, the optimal working
distance of QKD links will essentially scale as λQKD.
Finally, the existence of a rapid drop-off of the secret key rate at distances around
Ddrop arises when the probability to detect some signal sent in the quantum channel, ps,
becomes comparable to the probability to detect a dark count per detection time slot, pd.
This occurs around the distance Ddrop, for which we have ps ≃ exp(−Ddrop/λQKD) × ηd,
where ηd represents the detector efficiency. We thus find Ddrop ≃ λQKD log(ηd/pd). In
practice, when working with InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (SPADs)
operating at 1550 nm, the ratio ηd/pd is optimized by varying the different external
parameters of the detector such as the temperature, gate voltage or time slot duration.
The best published performances for InGaAs SPADs [20, 21] report values of the dark
counts pd ≃ 10−7 to 10−6 for a detection efficiency ηd around 10%, which leads to
Ddrop ∼ Dmax ∼ 100 − 120 km for QKD systems employing such detectors. For a
similar detection efficiency, the best available superconducting single-photon detectors
(SSPDs) present dark counts pd ≃ 10−8 to 10−6 [22], leading to a maximum distance
that can reach 140 km.
3.2. Toy model for QKD network cost derivation: a linear chain between two users
The linear chain as a simple asymptotic model of a quantum backbone network
As a first example of QKD network cost derivation and optimization, we will consider
what we will call the linear chain scenario. In particular, we consider two users, A and
B, that want to rely on QKD to exchange secret keys in a scenario that imposes the use
of several QKD links:
• The two QKD users are very far away : their distance is L = ||AB|| with L≫ Dmax.
• The two QKD users are exchanging secret bits at a very high rate. We will call V
the volume of calls between the two users A and B (units of V : bits of secret key),
and will assume V ≫ R0.
Because of the first condition, many intermediate nodes have to be used as trusted
key relays to ensure key transport over QKD links from A to B. Because of the second
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condition, many QKD links have to be deployed in parallel to reach a secret key
distribution rate capacity at least equal to the traffic volume.
The linear chain QKD network scenario is in a sense the simplest situation in
which an infrastructure such as a quantum backbone network, described in section 2,
is required. It therefore provides an interesting toy model for cost optimization and
topological considerations.
Cost model: assumptions and definitions
The generic purpose of cost optimization is to ensure a given objective in terms of
service, at the minimum cost. In the case of the linear chain scenario, this objective is
to be able to offer a secret bit rate of V bit/s between two users A and B separated by
a distance L, while minimizing the cost of the network infrastructure to be deployed.
In this and all subsequent models, we will consider as the total cost C of a QKD
network, the cost of the equipment to be deployed to build the network. This can be seen
as a simplifying assumption, since it is common, in network planning, to differentiate
between capital and operating expenditures. We have chosen here to restrict our models
to capital expenditures of QKD networks and will consider that their cost is arising from
two sources:
• The cost of QKD link equipment to be deployed. We will denote as CQKD the
unit cost per QKD link. CQKD essentially corresponds to the cost of a pair of QKD
devices. Note that here we implicitly assume that the deployment of optical fibers is
for free, or more precisely that it is done independently and prior to the deployment
of a QKD network.
• The cost of node equipment, which we denote as Cnode. Cnode typically corresponds
to the hardware cost (for example some specific kind of routers need to be deployed
inside QKD nodes), as well as the cost of the security infrastructure that is needed
to make a QKD node a trusted and secure location.
As explained before and shown on figure 2, a linear chain QKD network is com-
posed of a one-dimensional chain where adjacent QKD nodes are connected by QKD
chain segments, each segment being potentially composed of multiple QKD links to en-
sure that a capacity equal to the traffic volume is reached.
Alice Bob
L
l
Figure 2. The one-dimensional QKD chain linking two QKD users, Alice and Bob,
over a distance L. Since L is considered much longer than the maximum span of a
QKD link, Dmax, intermediate QKD nodes are needed to serve as trusted relays.
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Total cost of the linear chain QKD network
For convexity reasons, discussed in more detail at the end of this section, the topology
ensuring the minimum cost will correspond to place QKD nodes at regular intervals
between A and B. We denote by ℓ the distance between two intermediate nodes, which
then corresponds to the distance over which QKD links are operated within the linear
chain QKD network. As we shall see, the question of cost minimization will reduce to
finding the optimum value of QKD link operational distance, ℓopt, for the linear chain
QKD network.
There are clearly two antagonistic effects in the dependence of the total cost of the
considered network on ℓ:
• On the one hand, if QKD links are operated over long distances, their secret bit
capacity R(ℓ) decreases. This will impose the deployment of more QKD links in
parallel, on each chain segment linking two adjacent QKD nodes, and thus tends
to increase the total cost.
• On the other hand, it is clear that increasing the operating distance ℓ allows to
decrease the required number of intermediate trusted relay nodes, which leads to a
decreased cost.
The optimum operating distance ℓopt corresponds to the value of ℓ that minimizes
the total cost function C:
C = CQKD L
ℓ
V
R(ℓ)
+ Cnode
L
ℓ
(1)
It is important to note that, in the above equation, we have made the assumption
that we can neglect the effects of discretisation. This means that the length of the chain,
L, can be considered much longer than the length of individual QKD links, ℓ, and that
the traffic volume V can be considered as a continuous quantity, neglecting the discrete
jumps associated to variations in the number of calls.
Cost minimization and optimum working distance of QKD links
In the asymptotic limit of very high traffic volume V , the cost of nodes can be neglected
in comparison with the cost of QKD devices. The expression of the total cost in
equation (1) then reduces to the first term, and we have the following interesting
properties:
• The total cost is directly proportional to the product of the traffic volume V and
the total distance L.
• Optimizing the total cost C is equivalent to minimizing C(ℓ)/ℓ where C(ℓ) =
CQKD/R(ℓ) is the per-bit cost of one unit of secret key rate.
Furthermore, assuming that QKD links are operated in the linear part of their
characteristic (see figure 1), we can write C(ℓ) =
CQKD
R0
e ℓ/λQKD . Then, the value of ℓopt
that minimizes the quantity C(ℓ)/ℓ can be explicitly derived as
ℓopt = λQKD , (2)
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where λQKD was defined in section 3.1 as the natural scaling parameter of the function
R(ℓ).
In the general case, the second term of the cost function in equation (1),
corresponding to the cost of nodes, cannot be neglected. This second term does not
depend on the volume of traffic V , and is always decreasing with ℓ. As a consequence,
the optimum operating distance that minimizes C will always be greater than λQKD, the
value minimizing the first term in equation (1).
Under the assumption that the optimum distance will remain in the linear part of
the function logR(ℓ), we can derive the following implicit relation for ℓopt:
ℓopt = λQKD
(
1 +
Cnode
CQKD
R0
V
e−ℓ
opt/λQKD
)
(3)
The above equation allows for a quantitative discussion of the “weight” of the nodes
in the behavior of the cost function. Indeed, we can see that the influence of the node
cost is potentially important and can lead to an optimum working distance that can be
significantly greater than λQKD when
Cnode
CQKD
R0
V
≫ 1.
Existence of an optimum working distance and convexity of C(ℓ)
In most of the explicit derivations performed in this work, we assume a purely
linear dependency of logR(ℓ) on ℓ. This assumption is convenient but remains an
approximation since it does not take into account the drop-off of R(ℓ) occurring around
Ddrop.
It is however possible to demonstrate the existence of an optimum working distance
for QKD links in a more general case, by solely relying on the assumption that the
function R(ℓ) is log-concave, i.e. that logR(ℓ) is concave. The log-concavity of R(ℓ)
can be checked on a simple model inspired by the secret key rate formula for the BB84
QKD protocol with perfect single photons [4]. In particular, in this case we have
R(p) = 1 − 2h(p), where h(p) is the entropy associated to a quantum bit error rate
p, and assume that the dependence of the error rate p on the distance is of the form
p = a + b/η(ℓ) = a + b ℓ/λQKD , where a and b are parameters linked to the detection
system. In this setup, it is straightforward to verify numerically that logR(ℓ) is concave
for all reasonable values of a and b.
Since C(ℓ), the per-unit cost of secret bit rate on a QKD link, is proportional to
1/R(ℓ), the log-concavity of R(ℓ) implies the log-convexity of C(ℓ), which itself implies
the convexity of C(ℓ). Finally, we can write the total cost of the linear chain QKD
network as the sum of the cost of each chain segment and the cost of the node equipment,
namely
C(ℓ0, . . . , ℓn) = V
n∑
i=0
C(ℓi) + nCnode .
In the above equation, ℓ0 denotes the distance between A and the first node, ℓk,
k = 1, . . . n − 1, the distance between the kth node and the k + 1th node, and ℓn
the distance between the last node and B. For a convex function C, the minimization of
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i=0C(ℓi) under the constraint
∑n
i=0 ℓi = L, where L is the distance between A and B,
is obtained with ℓi = L/(n+1) for all i. Once we set ℓi = L/(n+1), the cost expression
in the above equation only depends on n, or equivalently on ℓ = L/(n+1). For large L,
we can disregard the fact that ℓ is an integer divider of L and approximate (n + 1)/n
by 1, which then leads to equation (1).
3.3. Cost of QKD networks: towards more general models
The linear chain toy model developed in section 3.2 provides an interesting intuition
into the behavior of the cost function. The most important result is that, in the limit of
large traffic rates and/or low cost of QKD nodes, the QKD network cost optimization
reduces to the minimization of C(ℓ)/ℓ ∼ 1/(R(ℓ)ℓ). This leads to the existence of an
optimum working distance, ℓopt, at which QKD links need to be operated in order to
minimize the global cost of the network deployment.
The linear chain QKD network model is however too restrictive in many aspects:
it is one-dimensional and limited to the description of a network providing service to
two users. We will now consider more general models, which allow us to study the more
realistic case of QKD networks spanning a two-dimensional area, and providing service
to a large number of users.
Modeling network spatial processes with stochastic geometry
Stochastic geometry is a very useful mathematical tool for modeling telecommunication
networks. It has the advantage of being able to describe the essential spatial
characteristics of a network using a small number of parameters [23]. It thus allows
to study some general characteristics of a given network, like the behavior of its cost
function, under a restricted set of assumptions. This approach fits well with the
objectives of this work, and so we have employed stochastic tools to model a QKD
backbone network.
As we shall see, instead of calculating the cost of a QKD network for fixed topologies
and traffic usage, we will try to understand the general behavior of the cost function
by calculating the average cost function, where the average will be taken over some
probability distributions of spatial processes modeling QKD users and QKD node
locations.
The collection of spatial locations of the QKD nodes over the plane will be repre-
sented by a spatial point process M = {Xi}. Then, as illustrated in figure 3, we define
a corresponding partition of the plane § as the ensemble of the convex polygons {Di},
known as the Vorono¨ı cells of nucleus {Xi}. Each Vorono¨ı cell Di is constructed by tak-
ing the intersection of the half-planes bounded by the bisectors of the segment [Xi, Xj]
and containing Xi. The system of all the cells creates the so-called Vorono¨ı partition.
Finally, we define the Delaunay graph as the graph, whose vertices are the {Xi} and
§ More accurately, the geometrical object we consider here is a tesselation, the boundaries of which
are neglected.
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whose edges are formed by connecting each Vorono¨ı cell nucleus {Xi} with the nuclei of
the adjacent Vorono¨ı cells.
u
v
Figure 3. Thick black lines: Vorono¨ı partition associated to a given distribution of
nodes. Thin black lines: the Delaunay graph, connecting the center of neighboring
Vorono¨ı cells. In the backbone QKD network model, backbone QKD links will indeed
correspond to the Delaunay graph, while backbone nodes correspond to the nucleus of
the Vorono¨ı cells. We have also represented on the same figure a typical end-to-end
path, between two QKD users u and v, under the Markov-path routing policy (see text
in section 3.6.2 for details).
User distribution and traffic
In the remaining of this paper, and in contrast to the linear chain toy model developed
in section 3.2, we will consider QKD networks providing secret key distribution service
to a large number of users, distributed over a two-dimensional area.
The user distribution will be modeled by a Poisson stochastic point process,
Π = {Ui}, defined over the support D of size L × L, while the average number of
QKD users will be denoted by µ. The point process Π will also be assumed to have
an intensity density f satisfying µ =
∫
f < ∞, which means that for every set E the
number of users within E is a Poisson random variable with mean
∫
E
f .
Finally, whenever this additional assumption will prove to be useful to perform the
desired calculations, we will consider that the distribution of users is homogeneous over
D, i.e. that the intensity function f is constant over D. We will denote this constant
user density by 1/α2
u
so that αu corresponds to a distance (it can be shown that for
large L, αu/2 is the average distance between the origin and the point Ui closest to the
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origin). We will have in this case:
µ =
∫
f = (L/αu)
2 . (4)
For the traffic model, we will generalize the assumption made for the linear chain
QKD network model: the traffic between any pair of QKD users will be seen as an
aggregate volume of calls (expressed in units of secret key exchange rate). The volume
of traffic will be assumed to be the same between any pair of users, and will be denoted
by V .
QKD networks with or without a hierarchical architecture
As was discussed in section 2, it is interesting to study to which extent deploying a
structure such as a backbone, which is synonymous to the existence of hierarchy in a
network, would be advantageous in the case of QKD networks. To this end, continuing
to place ourselves in the perspective of cost optimization, we will derive cost functions
for QKD network models with or without a quantum backbone. The obtained results
will then allow us to establish comparisons and thus discuss the interest of hierarchy in
quantum networks.
3.4. Cost function for a two-dimensional network without backbone: the generalized
QKD chain model
A direct way to generalize the two-user one-dimensional chain model presented in
section 3.2 is simply to assume that a chain of QKD links and intermediate nodes
will be deployed between each pair of users u and v within the QKD network. Each
chain will therefore be dimensioned in order to accommodate a volume V of calls. The
routing of calls is trivial on such a network. The distance between the intermediate
nodes on a chain will be denoted by ℓ, as in section 3.2.
Here as well, we neglect the effects of discretisation, i.e. the length of the chains,
||u−v||, will be considered much longer than the length of individual QKD links, ℓ, and
the traffic volume V will be considered a continuous quantity. Under these assumptions,
we know that the cost associated with a pair of users located respectively at positions
u and v and exchanging a volume V of calls is (see equation (1))
Cpair(u, v) = V ||u− v||C(ℓ)/ℓ + (||u− v||/ℓ)Cnode (5)
Recall that the distribution of users is described by a Poisson point process
Π = {Ui}. Then, we can calculate the average total cost of the QKD network, C, by
summing up the costs Cpair(Uk, Ul) associated with the QKD chains deployed between
each pair of users over k 6= l and then average this sum over the stochastic user point
process Π:
C = E
[∑
k 6=l
Cpair(Uk, Ul)
]
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= E
[∑
k 6=l
V ||Uk − Ul||C(ℓ)/ℓ + ||Uk − Ul||Cnode
]
= (V C(ℓ)/ℓ + Cnode/ℓ) δ , (6)
where δ is the average sum of distances over all pairs of two different users, namely
δ = E
[∑
k 6=l
||Uk − Ul||
]
. (7)
For a homogeneous Poisson point process Π with spatial density of users α−2
u
over a
square domain D of size L × L, it is possible to perform the exact integral calculation
of δ, yielding
δ = γ L5/α4
u
with γ =
1
3
log(1 +
√
2) +
2 +
√
2
15
≃ 0.5214 . (8)
3.5. Cost function for a two-dimensional QKD network with backbone
The backbone architectures we will consider in this work are topological : for a given
distribution of QKD nodes, which will be either deterministic (section 3.6.1) or stochas-
tic (section 3.6.2), the backbone cells and backbone links will strictly coincide with the
Vorono¨ı cells and the edges of the corresponding Delaunay graph defined above, respec-
tively.
Routing traffic over a QKD backbone network
The backbone hierarchical structure provides a convenient way to solve the routing
problem that we have adopted in our cost calculations. For a given origin-destination
pair of users (A,B) wishing to exchange a volume of calls VAB, the traffic is routed in
the following way:
• The traffic goes from A to its nearest QKD backbone node XA (center of the
backbone cell containing A), through a single QKD link (an access link).
• The traffic is routed through the optimal (less costly) path over the backbone
QKD network from XA to XB (QKD node closer to B).
• The traffic goes from XB to B.
The routing rule defined above can be characterized as geographical, in the sense
that it is driven by distance considerations. However, determining the optimal path in a
given backbone network of arbitrary topology may not be a tractable problem. Even in
standard networks, where the optimal path is the shortest one, an analytic computation
of the average length/cost is not always possible. In the context of backbone nodes
distributed as a Poisson point process, an alternative suboptimal routing policy, the so
calledMarkov path, has been proposed, and leads to analytic computation of the average
path length. In QKD networks, the cost is a non-linear function of the length and some
adjustments are required. We consider two different geometries for the backbone:
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(i) A square backbone QKD network (section 3.6.1), i.e. a regular structure where
nodes and links form a regular graph of degree 4. In this case finding the length
of the shortest path between two nodes is trivial: backbone nodes XA, XB can be
designated by cartesian coordinates (xA, yA), (xB, yB) and the shortest path length
is simply |xA−xB |+ |yA− yB|. Moreover, cost calculations are simplified using the
fact that the links between two neighbor nodes of the backbone all have the same
length.
(ii) A stochastic backbone network (section 3.6.2), where backbone nodes are dis-
tributed following a random point process and backbone cells are the corresponding
Vorono¨ı partition. For this stochastic backbone, we have used a routing technique
calledMarkov-path routing for which, as previously established by Tchoumatchenko
et al. [24, 25], the average length of routes can be calculated. In the following, we
will adapt these calculations to our cost function C(ℓ).
Generic derivation of the cost function for QKD backbone networks
For a QKD network with a backbone structure, we defineM = {Xi} as the point process
of the network node distribution, and Π = {Ui} as the point process of the network user
distribution, with intensity density f . Each node Xi is connected to some nodes in its
neighborhood and to the clients belonging to the associated cell Di. In the following,
we will assume that M is statistically independent of Π, and that the cells Di are the
Vorono¨ı cells associated to M , that is
Di =
{
x : ‖x−Xi‖ ≤ inf
j 6=i
‖x−Xj‖
}
. (9)
In the case of the QKD backbone network, our routing policy allows to calculate
Cpair(u, v;M), the QKD equipment cost associated with sending one unit of call between
users u and v, over a network whose backbone nodes are described by the point process
M :
Cpair(u, v;M) =


C(‖u−Xi‖) + C(‖v −Xi‖)
if u, v ∈ Di
C(‖u−Xi‖) + C(‖v −Xj‖) + Chop(i, j;M)
if u ∈ Di and v ∈ Dj with i 6= j ,
where C(ℓ) is the cost spent to send a secret bit on a QKD link over a distance ℓ and
Chop(i, j;M) is the cost to send a secret bit between the nodesXi andXj of the backbone
for the given routing policy.
Given that the volume between each pair of users is V , the average total cost C of
the QKD network then reads
C = CQKD + Cnode = V × E
[∑
k 6=l
Cpair(Uk, Ul;M)
]
+ CnodeN
2 ,
where N2 is the average number of nodes of the backbone deployed in the domain D of
size L× L. Here E denotes the average cost over the spatial distributions of users and
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backbone nodes, that is over the realizations of Π and M . Since M and Π are supposed
independently distributed, we may compute this average successively with respect toM
and Π. The total cost, averaged only over Π, can be decomposed as follows:
E
[∑
k 6=l
Cpair(Uk, Ul;M)
]
=
∫
Cpair(u, v;M) f(u) f(v) du dv
=
∑
k
∫
Dk×Dk
{C(‖u−Xk‖) + C(‖v −Xk‖)} f(u) f(v) du dv
+
∑
k 6=l
∫
Dk×Dl
{C(‖u−Xk‖) + C(‖v −Xl‖) + Chop(k, l;M)} f(u) f(v) du dv
=
∑
k
∑
l
∫
Dk×Dl
{C(‖u−Xk‖) + C(‖v −Xl‖)} f(u) f(v) du dv
+
∑
k 6=l
∫
Dk×Dl
Chop(k, l;M) f(u) f(v) du dv
As we can see from the last expression, the total cost C can be separated in three terms:
C =: C loc + Cbb + Cnode , (10)
where C loc takes into account all connections from one client to the closest backbone
node, Cbb all connections from one backbone node to another, and Cnode is the cost of
node equipment. The explicit models that we will study will allow us to compare the
behavior of these different terms and thus to understand how QKD network backbone
topologies can be optimized.
3.6. Cost calculations for two explicit quantum backbone models
3.6.1. Cost of the square backbone QKD network
Network model: We consider, as a first simple example, the case of a QKD backbone
network that has a perfectly regular topology, and for which the shortest path length
between two backbone nodes is easily determined.
The architecture we consider is the following: users are distributed as previously
over a large area D of size L × L and the backbone QKD network is a regular graph
of degree 4, i.e. the backbone QKD nodes and links constitute a square network.
The structure of the square backbone QKD network and the way a call is routed is
summarized on figure 4. The free parameter with respect to which we will perform the
cost optimization is the size of backbone cells αbb. We will also make the assumption
that the user density function f is uniform over D.
Computation of Cbb for the square network: We set Xk = kαbb and Dk = Xk +
αbb[−1/2, 1/2]2 with k ∈ Z2 and, for all k 6= l,
Chop(k, l;M) = ‖k − l‖1C(αbb) .
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L
L
l
l
B
A
NA
NB
Figure 4. Structure of a two-dimensional regular square backbone network: a regular
array of cells of dimension αbb spans a region of size L × L. The user distribution is
described by a random point process. In each cell, a central node collects all the local
traffic. Every user in the cell is thus connected via a QKD link to the central node
of its cell. On top of this array of cells, a backbone network connects first-neighbor
QKD nodes with a QKD trunk. Traffic on the backbone network is routed trough the
shortest path. The dotted blue line describes the path followed for the communication
between two users A and B (see text for more details).
Here, ‖k− l‖1 corresponds to the number of hops between Xk and Xl and C(αbb) to the
per bit cost of one hop.
Calling µi the average number of QKD users in a backbone cell i, we have:
Cbb = V
∑
k 6=l
µkµl C
hop(k, l;M) (11)
Hence,
Cbb = V C(αbb)µ
TΓµ ,
where µ is the column vector with entries µk, k ∈ Z2, and Γ is the Toeplitz array indexed
on Z2 with entries Γk,l = ‖k − l‖1.
Since the density of users f is constant and equal to σ on its support D, where
D :=
⋃
k∈{0,...,N−1}2 Dk, µk is the same for all cells Dk: µk = µ/N
2, with N2 denoting
the total number of backbone cells, and µ = (L/αu)
2 the mean number of users over D
(see equation (4)). Hence, we find
Cbb = V C(αbb)µ
2/N4
∑
k,l∈{0,...,N−1}2
‖k − l‖1 .
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Now, we compute
∑
k,l∈{0,...,N−1}2
‖k − l‖1 =
N−1∑
k1,l1=0
N−1∑
k2,l2=0
2∑
i=1
|ki − li|
= 2
N−1∑
k1,l1=0
N−1∑
k2,l2=0
|k1 − l1| = 2N2
N−1∑
k,l=0
|k − l|
= 4N2
N−1∑
k=0
∑
l<k
|k − l| = 4N2
N−1∑
k=0
∑
l<k
|k − l|
∼ 2
3
N5
where the asymptotic equivalence holds as N →∞. Using N ∼ L/αbb and equation (4),
we obtain, as N →∞,
Cbb ∼ V µ
2
N4
C(αbb)
2
3
N5 =
2
3
C(αbbα
4
u
)
αbb
L5 V =
2
3
C(αbb)
αbb
µ2V L . (12)
In the latter expression, we have four multiplicative terms:
(i) 2/3, a constant depending only on the dimension and the geometry of the backbone
network (for a cube of dimension d, we could generalize our calculation and would
find d/3);
(ii) C(αbb)/αbb, a cost function depending only on the distance αbb between the nodes
of the backbone;
(iii) µ2 V , the square of the mean number of users times the volume of call per pair of
users, i.e. in our communication model, the total volume of the communications
over which the total cost is computed;
(iv) L, the size of the support of f , that is of the domain where the users lie.
To understand better the derived expression for Cbb, it is interesting to compare
it with C loc and Cnode. Indeed, we can show that C loc ≃ µ2C, where C stands for the
per-bit cost function C averaged over one cell. In the case of the square network with
αbb × αbb square cells, these cells are contained between two circles of radius αbb/2 and
αbb
√
2/2 < αbb. Since C is an increasing function of distance we have C < C(αbb), and
we can thus derive the important following property: In the limit of large networks,
i.e. for L≫ αbb, the backbone cost is dominant over the local cost. We will see
in the following section that this property is preserved for a backbone with randomly
positioned nodes and an appropriate routing policy. Furthermore, we will see that for
large L, the backbone node equipment cost Cnode is negligible. Therefore, to optimize the
cost (equation 10), we only need to minimize Cbb. Assuming a square regular backbone,
this means choosing αbb so as to minimize C(αbb)/αbb, exactly as in the case of the linear
chain QKD network model of section 3.2.
Hence, if we take C(ℓ) =
CQKD
R0
e ℓ/λQKD , the cost is minimized for
αopt
bb
= λQKD . (13)
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3.6.2. Cost calculation for a stochastic QBB with Markov-path routing
We now compute C loc and Cbb in the case where the routing policy is the so called
Markov path, as proposed in [25], where some general formulae are given for computing
average costs in a general framework (see also [24]). The routing policy is defined
as follows. First, all pairs of nodes whose cells share a common edge are connected.
The corresponding graph is a Delaunay graph. Next, given two users A and B with
respective positions u and v, we define a finite sequence of the nodes Xk0, Xk1, . . . , Xkn
in the successive cells encountered when drawing a line from u to v. This routing policy
is illustrated on figure 3.
By definition, Xk0 and Xkn are the centers of the cells containing u and v
respectively and
C loc = V ×
∫
D×D
E [C(‖u−Xk0‖) + C(‖v −Xkn‖)] f(u) f(v) du dv
= V µ2 κloc , (14)
where µ :=
∫
f is the average total number of users and, by stationarity of the point
process M ,
κloc = E [C(‖u−Xk0‖)] + E [C(‖v −Xkn‖)] = 2 E [C(‖X0‖)]
with X0 defined as the center of the cell containing the origin. Note that κ
loc denotes the
average local cost per secret bit and per pair of users. If M is a Poisson point process
with intensity α−2
bb
, we further have
P(‖X0‖ > t) = P(#{Xk : ‖Xk‖ ≤ t} = 0) = exp(−πt2α−2bb ) ,
and hence
κloc = 4πα−2
bb
∫
R+
C(t) t exp(−πt2α−2
bb
)dt = 4π
∫
R+
C(αbbu) u exp(−πu2)du . (15)
For Cbb, we can write
Cbb = V ×
∫
D×D
E
[
n∑
i=1
C(‖Xki −Xki−1‖)
]
f(u) f(v) du dv .
Applying [25, Theorem 2] or the results (in particular Theorem 2.41 and Remark 2.4.2)
in section 2.4 of [24] (as done in Corollaries 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 in [24]), we obtain
E
[
n∑
i=1
C(‖Xki −Xki−1‖)
]
= κbb ‖u− v‖ ,
where
κbb := 2α−1
bb
∫
(r,ψ,φ)∈A
C (2αbbr sin({ψ − φ}/2)) {cos(φ)− cos(ψ)} r2 e−π r2 dψ dφ dr , (16)
and A = R+ × {(ψ, φ) : 0 < |φ| ≤ ψ < π}. Finally we find that
Cbb = V κbb δ , (17)
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where δ is the average total distance between two different users defined in equation (7)
and computed in equation (8), and κbb denotes the average backbone cost per secret bit
and per length unit of the distance separating a pair of users.
From equations (10), (14) and (17), and observing that here the average total
number of backbone cells N2 = (L/αbb)
2, we find
C =: C loc + Cbb + Cnode = V × [µ2κloc + δκbb]+ Cnode(L/αbb)2 , (18)
where µ2 and δ are related to the spatial distribution of the users, and κloc and κbb
are constants related to the geometry of the backbone and to the routing policy. For
users uniformly distributed in a square of side length L with intensity α−2
u
, we have
µ2 ≃ (L/αu)4 and δ ≃ L5/α4u.
Using (15), (16), (18) and the above approximations of µ2 and δ, we see that the
total cost C only depends on L, αu and αbb. Now, for given αu and L, we take αbb so that
C is minimized and examine which term in the right-hand side of (18) dominates the
total cost C as L→∞ in this context. To this end, we first study each term separately.
We let c denote a constant not depending on L, αbb in the following reasoning. Observe
that since C is convex and increasing, C(ℓ) ≥ c × ℓ. Using this in (15) and in (16),
we get C loc ≥ c αbbL4 and Cbb ≥ c L5, respectively. Concerning the last term, we have
Cnode ≈ c L2/α2
bb
. It follows that at fixed L, C loc → ∞ as αbb → ∞ and Cnode → ∞ as
αbb → 0, from which we can deduce that the optimal αbb stays away of 0 and ∞. Now,
clearly, if αbb stays away from 0 and ∞, the above bounds show that Cbb dominates as
L → ∞. Hence, for large L, the optimal intensity αbb is the one that minimizes Cbb
or, equivalently, κbb. To find this optimal intensity, the following result is useful for an
exponential cost C(ℓ) =
CQKD
R0
e ℓ/λQKD :
Lemma 3.1 Define κbb as in equation (16) with C(ℓ) =
CQKD
R0
e ℓ/λQKD. Then the
following analytical formula holds
κbb = CQKDR
−1
0 λ
−1
QKD
4
π
[
eα
2
bb
/(πλ2QKD){1 + erf(αbb/(
√
πλQKD))}+ λQKD/αbb
]
,
where
erf(x) =
2√
π
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt .
Proof. Let s = λQKD/αbb. We have∫
(r,ψ,φ)∈A
exp
(
2s−1r sin({ψ − φ}/2)) {cos(φ)− cos(ψ)} r2 e−π r2 dψ dφ dr
= 8
∫ π/2
v=0
∫ ∞
r=0
exp(2s−1r sin(v)− πr2) r2 sin(v) dv dr.
Integrating with respect to r yields
κbb = CQKDR
−1
0 λ
−1
QKD
×
[
2
π
+
4s
π
∫ π/2
v=0
sin(v){1 + 2 sin2(v)/(πs2)} exp(sin2(v)/(πs2))(1 + erf(sin(v)/(√πs) dv
]
.
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Further computations yield
κbb = CQKDR
−1
0 λ
−1
QKD
4
π
[
e1/(πs
2){1 + erf(1/(s√π))}+ s
]
,
which is the desired expression.
Using Lemma 3.1, the αbb minimizing κ
bb, denoted as αopt
bb
below, can easily be
calculated using a numerical procedure. We find
αopt
bb
≈ 1.2490 λQKD . (19)
This result should be compared with the result of equation (13), where the backbone
geometry is deterministic and also characterized by the node intensity 1/α2
bb
. The two
results show that the choice of the backbone and routing policy does influence the
optimal node intensity, albeit in a modest way.
3.7. From cost optimization results to QKD network planning
Matching QKD network topology with QKD links optimum working distance
The calculations in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 point to one common result: it appears
that, for large networks, the costs associated with the QKD devices that have to be
deployed in backbone nodes to serve the demand are always dominant over the local
costs, associated to the end connections between QKD users and backbone nodes.
Moreover, the optimization of backbone costs indicates that minimum cost will be
reached when the typical distance between backbone nodes is of the order of λQKD, the
scaling parameter of the curve R(l).
These results lead to the following statements:
• When a QKD network deployment is planned, is seems optimal to choose the
location of network nodes so that QKD links will be operated over distances
comparable to the optimal distance ℓopt. As we have seen in our different models,
ℓopt is always lower bounded by a pre-factor times λQKD. Indeed, when the total cost
of node equipment can be neglected compared to the cost of QKD devices, as it is
the case for large networks, then the optimum distance ℓopt is indeed comparable
to λQKD, which is roughly equal to 20 km. This indicates that current QKD
technologies, for which Dmax is already significantly larger than 20 km, are well
suited for metropolitan operation. On the other hand, the typical distance between
amplifiers, in optical wide area networks, is of the order of 80 km. If we wanted
to deploy trusted QKD networks with the current generation of QKD devices, the
QKD links would have to be operated close to their maximum distance, where
the unit of secret bit rate becomes very expensive. Although technically already
feasible, the deployment of wide area QKD networks thus remains a challenge. We
can however anticipate that this challenge will be overcome within the next years,
as new generations of QKD protocols and devices, able to generate keys at higher
rates, and with larger maximum distances are already being presented [26, 27, 28].
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• The results on cost minimization that we have obtained could provide some helpful
guidelines for QKD device developers: they may help promoting the idea that what
will really matter, in the perspective of real network deployment, will be to focus
on the optimization of their systems around typical network-optimum working dis-
tances. Optimizing QKD devices in this regime means reducing the cost of a unit
bit rate at a reasonable distance, where the throughput of the QKD link is not
considerably smaller than R0. It will be of course always profitable to design QKD
devices that can reach very long distances, but as discussed in [29], from a system
development point of view it can be significantly different to optimize QKD devices
to reach the longest possible distance Dmax, and to optimize them so that the cost
of unit of bit rate is as low as possible, around the distance ℓopt minimizing network
costs.
In which regime are backbones useful?
We would like now to use our calculation results to analyze in which regime QKD
backbones become economically interesting, i.e. under which conditions it is interesting
to introduce some hierarchy and resource mutualization in QKD networks, in order to
decrease the total deployment cost.
In the previous sections we have performed cost calculations that can be used to
establish some quantitative comparisons between:
• The cost of a QKD network with no hierarchy as in the generalized linear chain
QKD network, whose cost calculations have been performed in section 3.4.
• The cost of a QKD network with one level of hierarchy, which is the case of the
square backbone QKD network studied in section 3.6.1.
Since these two cost calculations have been performed under the same assumptions
regarding user distribution and traffic demand, we can use the results given in
equations (6) and (12) to compare the total network deployment costs, respectively
for the generalized linear chain model and for a QKD network with a square backbone
(for which we have seen that we could neglect the cost of the local access network).
The condition under which it will be more cost effective to deploy a quantum
backbone than to connect all pair of users by one-dimensional chains of QKD links can
be described by the following inequality between the respective optimal costs
Copt,chain
2D,chain
≥ Copt,square
2D,square
⇔
(
V C(ℓopt)/ℓopt + Cnode/ℓ
opt
)
γσ2L5 ≥ 2
3
C(αopt
bb
)/αopt
bb
σ2L5 V + CnodeL
2/αopt
bb
2 (20)
The above equation is not very convenient to handle because in general αopt
bb
6= ℓopt.
However,
Copt,chain
2D,chain
≥ Copt,square
2D,square
⇒ Copt,square
2D,chain
≥ Copt,square
2D,square
(21)
Thus, we can derive a necessary condition under which the deployment of a
backbone for a QKD network is a better solution than a design that would solely rely
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on the generalized linear chain of QKD links to transport the traffic:
Copt,square
2D,chain
≥ Copt,square
2D,square
⇔ Cnode (σ2L3αoptbb γ − 1) ≥ C(αoptbb )V σ2L3αoptbb (
2
3
− γ)
⇔ Cnode (σ2/σ∗2 − 1) ≥ C(αoptbb ) V σ2/σ∗2 (
2
3γ
− 1) (22)
with σ∗ = 1/
√
L3αoptbb γ .
Keeping in mind that 2
3γ
− 1 is a positive number, we can use the last inequality to
make the following observations:
• First, it appears that, if the user density σ is smaller than σ∗, which we can
qualify as a critical user density, then equation (22) can never be verified. This
means that below σ∗ it will never be interesting to deploy a backbone. This result
has a clear interpretation: backbone infrastructures can only be interesting in the
case where sharing resources offers a cost reduction. And the incentive to share a
backbone infrastructure can only exist if there are enough users. The minimum total
number of users required to have a cost incentive towards backbone deployment is
σ∗ L2 =
√
L/(γαoptbb ).
• In case σ is larger than the critical user density σ∗, we enter a regime where there
will be an incentive to deploy a quantum backbone essentially if the cost of a node
Cnode dominates over the cost of QKD link equipment to be deployed, which scales
as C(αoptbb )V . This also has a clear interpretation: if we take the extreme case where
building a node (and installing node equipment inside it) is zero, we can foresee that
there will be no incentive to build a backbone: it will always be cheaper to deploy
direct chains between each pair of users. The motivation to build a backbone arises
when efforts associated to opening a QKD node are important. This will of course
be the case if QKD node equipment is expensive, as we can see from equation (22),
but it is also intuitive that, in case significant efforts are required to build new QKD
nodes, mutualization of nodes through a backbone structure will be a cost effective
solution.
4. Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we performed a topological analysis of quantum key distribution networks
with trusted repeater nodes. In particular, under specific assumptions on the user and
node distributions as well as the call traffic and routing in such networks, we derived
cost functions for different network architectures. We first considered a linear chain
network as a basic model that served the purpose of illustrating the main techniques
and ideas that we used, and then moved on to more advanced network configurations
that were in some cases enhanced with a backbone structure. Using cost minimization
arguments, we obtained results on the optimal working points of QKD links and spatial
distribution of QKD nodes, and examined the importance of introducing hierarchy into
QKD networks.
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Our results indicate that, in the context of QKD networks, it is more cost-effective
and therefore advantageous to operate individual QKD links at their optimal working
point, which is in general significantly shorter than the maximum span of such links.
This conclusion motivates the research of new experimental compromises in practical
QKD systems, and can be illustrated by considering examples of such systems where the
characteristics of either a hardware component (for example a single-photon detector)
or a software algorithm (for example a reconciliation code) can be experimentally
manipulated as a function of distance [29].
In general, it is clear that, as the realization of more and more advanced QKD
networks approaches the realm of actual deployment, it becomes necessary to orient
the research on QKD devices and links towards cost-related directions, and extend
the techniques we have presented here to more sophisticated network technologies and
architectures.
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